

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Bruce Lee Hudson, # 101021,	) C/A No. 4:11-2210-HFF-TER
	)
Plaintiff,	)
	)
vs.	) Report and Recommendation
	)
Investigator Brandy Spears, and	)
Sheriff Leon Lott, of the Richland County Sheriff	)
Department,	)
	)
Defendants.	)
	)

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This is a civil action filed *pro se* by a local detention center inmate.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff is incarcerated at Alvin S. Glenn (Richland County) Detention Center. In this Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to force Richland County law enforcement officials to file criminal charges against five or six corrections officers who allegedly "gang beat" Plaintiff at the detention center on October 31, 2010. He does not name any of the corrections officers as Defendants and he does not ask for any damages arising from the alleged beating. Instead, Plaintiff is suing the Richland County Sheriff and one of his investigators, claiming that they violated his constitutional (due process/equal protection) rights by refusing to file criminal charges against the corrections officers who Plaintiff claims committed a "hate crime" against him. He calls the beating a "hate crime," but Plaintiff does not allege that the gang beating was committed on him because of his race, gender, or religion. He claims that Defendant Spears, an investigator with the Richland County Sheriff's Office, told him the beating

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1), and D.S.C. Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(e), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such *pro se* cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

was justified because he had trash in his cell. There are no allegations that Defendant Spears or Defendant Lott refused to file criminal charges against the corrections officers because of Plaintiff's race, gender, religion, or any other reason than Defendant Spears' conclusion that Plaintiff caused the corrections officers to undertake the force that they did. As relief, Plaintiff seeks a "new" investigation into the gang beating including lie detector tests for both sides, or, alternatively, damages of "10 million dollars."

### **Standard of Review**

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's *pro se* Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr.*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

*Pro se* complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. *De'Lonta v. Angelone*, 330 F. 3d 630, 630n.1 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

However, even under this less stringent standard, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

### Analysis

The Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal without service on the Defendants because the Plaintiff does not have any constitutional right to, or, in fact, any judicially cognizable interest in, the prosecution or non-prosecution of another person. *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); *see Diamond v. Charles*, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986)(applying *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.* and collecting cases); *Doyle v. Ok. State Bar Ass'n*, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566-67 (10th Cir. 1993); *Lane v. Correll*, 434 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1970). Also, several federal courts have held that, in absence of allegations that protective services such as criminal investigations and charges are being withheld *solely* for an illegally discriminatory reason, a private citizen, such as the Plaintiff, may not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the failure of law enforcement or prosecuting authorities to charge or prosecute certain other private citizens criminally. *See, e.g., McKee v. City of Rockwall*, 877 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Although there is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not discriminate in providing such protection;" plaintiff victim of assault could arguably sustain equal protection claim for inadequacy of police protection *only upon proof* that non-arrest of perpetrator was result of discrimination against protected class); *Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas*, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Although there is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not discriminate in providing such protection."); *Campbell v. Bowlin*, 724 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1984)(plaintiff should have been permitted to have jury consider § 1983 claim where he presented proof that showed he was denied municipal services on account of his race); *Collins v. Palczewski*, 841 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D. Nev. 1993) ("Long

ago the courts of these United States established that 'criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions.'"); *Nieves-Ramos v. Gonzalez-De-Rodriguez*, 737 F.Supp. 727 (D. P.R. 1990)(no cause of action under section 1985 against judge and prosecutor for failing to arrest person where no allegations of illegal discrimination); *Johnson v. Craft*, 673 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D. Miss. 1987)(“there appears to be no federal constitutional right to have criminal wrongdoers brought to justice”).

As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

[T]here is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered [or otherwise injured] by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators *but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.* The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order. *Discrimination in providing protection against private violence could of course violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that is not alleged here.* All that is alleged is a failure to protect [the Plaintiff] and others like her from a dangerous madman, and as the State of Illinois has no federal constitutional duty to provide such protection its failure to do so is not actionable under section 1983.

*Bowers v. DeVito*, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1982)(emphasis added).

Also closely on point is *Leeke v. Timmerman*, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981), which arose in South Carolina. In *Leeke*, inmates who were allegedly beaten by prison guards sought criminal arrest warrants against the guards. The inmates presented sworn statements to a state magistrate, but the state magistrate, upon a Solicitor's request, declined to issue the warrants. In *Leeke*, the Supreme Court of the United States reiterated its earlier holding in *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, and again ruled that a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution of

other persons. *See* 454 U.S. at 86-87; *see also In re Appointment of Independent Counsel*, 766 F.2d 70, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1985); *Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller*, 477 F.2d 375, 378-83 (2d Cir. 1973). Moreover, in its *Timmerman* opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States cited a similar precedent from the Supreme Court of South Carolina. *See* 454 U.S. at 87 n. 2 (citing *State v. Addison*, 2 S.C. 356, 364 (1871)).

It is elemental that “[s]ection 1983 imposes liability on anyone who under color of state law ‘subjects ... any citizen ... or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ...,’ and thus applies *only* if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right.” *Bowers v. DeVito*, 686 F.2d at 618 (emphasis added) (citing to *Baker v. McCollan*, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979); *Paul v. Davis*, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1976); *Bonner v. Coughlin*, 545 F.2d 565, 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1976)). Plaintiff asserts that his “constitutional rights” have been violated by the Defendants’ failure to arrest and charge the persons he claims assaulted him, but the authorities cited and discussed above make clear that, generally, private citizens have no federal constitutional right to have any other individual charged with a crime.

Although Plaintiff specifically references “due process” and “equal protection” in his Complaint, there are no allegations that the Plaintiff is a member of any specific class who is entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Veney v. Wyche*, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002). Moreover, there are no allegations to the effect that the Defendants have failed or refused to act because of a protected trait, or other illegal discrimination, or that they violated any right of Plaintiff to notice and opportunity to be heard with regard to the alleged attack. Thus, no substantive or procedural due- process claims are stated. *See Ruttenberg v. Jones*, 283 F. App’x 121, 128-29

(4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008). No other potential § 1983 claims or other federal causes of action are evident from the face of the Complaint.

**Recommendation**

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice. *See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Haines v. Kerner; Brown v. Briscoe*, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); *Boyce v. Alizaduh; Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d at 74; *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

s/Thomas E. Rogers, III

Thomas E. Rogers, III  
United States Magistrate Judge

August 30, 2011  
Florence, South Carolina

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
Post Office Box 2317  
Florence, South Carolina 29503

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).